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Is there a link between governance systems and the ability to act? Could the EU do better in 
times of crisis?  And is the right level of response national or transnational?   
 
 
With the crisis well underway for four months now, as the infection started in Wuhan, China 
in late November 2019, the first analyses begin to emerge of what this crisis means for our 
society and more precisely for the future of liberal democracy. While it is easy to see that one 
way or the other, our pattern of working and our lifestyle will be impacted by COVID-19, 
some political analysts and sociologists are going further to predict that this crisis will result 
in a growing tendency amongst our citizens to prefer effective authoritarianism above slow 
and ineffective democracy. To make their case, they highlight the fast and efficient way the 
Chinese leadership managed the outbreak in comparison to the slow, hesitant and in some 
cases even chaotic management by its European and American counterparts. 
 
While it is true that China seems to have overcome COVID-19 (at least, there are not many 
new infections detected anymore after two months of lockdown in Wuhan), their approach 
is far from an example to follow. On the contrary. A timeline of the early days of China's 
outbreak proves clearly that for weeks, there was a cover-up by the Chinese authorities. 
Studies have indicated that if the authorities had acted three weeks earlier than they did the 
number of coronavirus cases could have been reduced by 95% and its geographic spread 
limited.  
 
By contrast, the ways the different neighbouring countries of China (by the way, mostly 
democracies) have handled their own outbreaks are experiences to look at very closely and, 
if possible, to repeat. Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore have all 
managed the crisis more or less successfully. In all of these countries, authorities have 
limited the number of infections and deaths far below the dramatic levels we see today in 
European countries like Italy or Spain – numbers which are still increasing day by day. 
 
South Korea is probably the best example of how to handle this pandemic. As a democracy, 
it has not used authoritarian methods or rules. On the contrary, immediately following the 
lockdown of Wuhan on 23 January 2020, it rolled out a huge, fully transparent testing 
programme (testing around 300,000 people) combined with stringent case isolation. The 
number of SARS-CoV-2 infections in South Korea will most likely be maintained below 10 
thousand, and this for a population of more than 50 million people, ranking somewhere 
between Spain and France. 
 
So while there is no actual empirical evidence to argue that authoritarian rule is more 
effective or better suited to fight a global pandemic than our liberal democracy, what 
explains the dramatic explosion of COVID-19 in Europe and probably the US in the upcoming 
weeks? The number of infections in Europe has surpassed China, while the Chinese 
population is triple that of Europe. The number of deaths in Italy alone has also surpassed 
that of China. And there are still no signs that the outbreak has reached its peak in Europe, 
let alone is stabilising or under control. 
 
There are certainly a number of explanations to be given for this dramatic evolution. The 
most common one is that Europe, in contrast to the East and South Asian countries 
mentioned above, is far away from China. This gives a false sense of security. As was the case 
with Ebola, SARS or the Zika virus, we thought that COVID-19 would also be a crisis that 
would mainly spread, and disappear, locally. Or at least could be contained locally. So, while 
countries like South Korea and Taiwan went into crisis mode in the immediate aftermath of 
the lockdown in Wuhan, European countries did not react substantially. But as COVID-19 is 
very contagious and we live in a globalised world, after a few days and not even weeks the 
virus also affected the (unprepared) European continent with the devastating consequences 
we all see today. 
 
However, this does not explain the huge difference between Europe and China. China was 
also unprepared in December 2019, as was Europe two months later. What ultimately drives 
the difference in numbers of infections and deaths? Many analysts point the finger to lifestyle 
differences between China (and East and South Asia in general) and Europe. They argue that 
Europeans are individualistic hedonists and lack discipline, while Chinese, and by extension 
all Koreans, Japanese and Hong Kongese, are community-driven, disciplined and conditioned 
to hierarchy. Social distancing or self-quarantining is thus easier to impose in Asia than they 
are in Europe. 
 
It is an explanation that sounds plausible, and perhaps there is some truth to it – but citing 
cultural differences alone as a reason for the current discrepancy between Asia and Europe 
does not withstand the simple empirical test of looking at the differences inside Europe. And 
what do we see? There are no big differences. All EU countries started their precautionary 
measures far too late. And all member states follow more or less the same pandemic curve. 
More ‘hedonist’ Greeks and more ‘disciplined’ Germans and Swedes alike. The only 
difference is that the epidemic started at different dates, first in Italy and then progressively 
in all other member states. Secondly, there is a difference in death rates, which is likely 
caused by the differences in the quantity of tests effectuated and quality of the national 
healthcare systems. 
 
LACK OF GOOD GOVERNANCE  
 
This brings us back to square one. If it is not authoritarianism, democracy, or differences in 
our societal DNA that causes the dramatic degradation of the coronavirus outbreak in 
Europe, then what is the real cause? To find an answer to that question, I want to recall a 
book by two American-British economists and political scientists, Daron Acemoglu and 
James A. Robinson, published in 2012: Why Nations Fail. Their thesis is as simple as it is 
genius. Nations, and by extension every large public authority, will fail when they are driven 
by bad institutions. Because bad institutions lead to bad governance. And bad governance 
leads to bad results (i.e. more suffering). By contrast, good institutions will produce good 
governance and better results (i.e. less suffering). 
 
It seems simple, and yes, it is simple at first sight. But the consequences are huge if we apply 
this wisdom to the way the pandemic has not been properly managed in Europe. Applying 
the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson leads in fact to the conclusion that the dramatic 
transmission of COVID-19 on our continent is caused not by accident, but by a lack of 
adequate institutions and, ditto, good governance in the European Union.  
 
And since the end of January 2020, when Wuhan went in lockdown, we see evidence of this 
every single day. European citizens have been watching the daily unfolding of a crisis in 
which national authorities are taking half measures pointing in different directions, when 
we all know that decisions should be taken centrally following one line of command during 
a pandemic. A pandemic is not like war; it is war. And what we have seen in Europe during 
these past eight weeks is exactly the opposite: 27 centres of decision, 27 lines of command. 
 
Italy’s cry for help to replenish something as basic as surgical masks remained unanswered 
for weeks by all other member states. It was China that eventually helped first. After the 
initial outbreak in Northern Italy and the lockdown of several villages in Veneto and 
Lombardy, no common stringent rules and procedures were ordered, like the halt of border 
crossings or the massive testing of all people returning from ski resorts. Weeks afterwards, 
when the virus had spread to the four corners of Europe, some member states started to take 
drastic measures, from closing bars, restaurants and schools to even borders, while other 
countries carried on as if nothing was happening. 
 
In Britain, the father of the Prime Minister told a TV audience that he would simply neglect 
the recommendations of his son and continue his daily visit to his pub. Donald Trump did 
not blink when delivering his discriminatory travel ban against (certain) European 
countries. It has led to surreal situations, like the one between Belgium and the Netherlands, 
when irresponsible Belgian citizens visited shops and pubs in Dutch towns to compensate 
for the closing of theirs. Or the more than 60km queue of heavy trucks on the border between 
Poland and Germany, disrupting supply chains and causing enormous economic damage – 
which makes no sense at all, as it is not goods but persons who transmit the virus. 
 
On top of that, fundamentally different epidemiological approaches in the fight against the 
virus started to appear in Europe. Some countries, like Britain and the Netherlands, pursued 
a policy of so-called “herd immunity”, while most member states chose the path of “full 
confinement” (i.e. social distancing, closed schools, quarantines). Even when it seems that 
today, under the pressure of their public opinion, the UK and the Netherlands have also 
changed their mind, this fight between ‘herd immunity’ and ‘full confinement’ reminds me of 
the desperate European indecisiveness we witnessed in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
in 2008. The eternal debate between ‘austerity’ and ‘growth’. The gruelling battle between 
the followers of Ferguson and those of Krugman. 
 
ONE CENTRE OF DECISION, ONE LINE OF COMMAND AND TWO BAZOOKAS  
 
If during the last two months one thing became clear, it is that we cannot continue like this; 
that this is not ‘business as usual’. Intergovernmental cooperation is good and necessary, but 
it is absolutely insufficient to tackle a pandemic crisis of the magnitude we face today. It is 
not with an inflation of videoconferences between ministers of health, interior or finance 
that we will win this war. To overcome a pandemic crisis of this magnitude, we need far 
more. We need one centre of decision and one line of command, and this on a 
continental scale.  
 
To win this war, we need the discretionary power of a fully competent European executive. 
An executive that, under the democratic control of the Council (member states) and 
Parliament (citizens), can fully act on the ground. This can range from issuing common 
mandatory rules on testing, quarantining and social distancing, common tenders and 
distribution of test kits, essential medicines and life-saving medical equipment to the closing 
of national or regional borders if deemed necessary. At the heart of this system should be a 
European Health Agency, composed of the continent’s best experts, instead of the 27 teams 
of experts we have now. Let there be no misunderstanding: the national or regional level 
would remain responsible for issues related to health systems, medicines or hospitals. There 
is absolutely no reason to centralise that. But they would have to work under the umbrella 
of a common mandatory European rulebook when a severe crisis like a pandemic occurs. 
 
But what is necessary for the health of our citizens is also necessary for the dramatic 
economic fallout of COVID-19, which will be huge. We will enter a deep recession – if we are 
not already in one. We must react immediately to ensure that the economic downturn is as 
short as possible and will be followed by an economic revival – avoiding the 'U' and hoping 
for a ‘V’, as economists say. After initial hesitation, the European Central Bank (ECB) has 
definitely understood this. The Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) of €750 
billion is one of the two bazookas we need to avoid a freefall of our wealth and our economy.  
 
However, more will be needed. PEPP is defensive and indispensable, as are the many 
necessary national support programmes that have been launched in almost all member 
states. But we will also need an ‘offensive bazooka’ to first stabilise and then provoke a 
recovery of our European economy. A huge macroeconomic stability programme which 
represents 2%, 3% or even more of the EU’s GDP. It must be funded through the introduction 
of a new ‘Euro Safe Asset’, a common European liability, guaranteed by the European budget 
(while not undermining the finances of the member states) and actively supported by the 
ECB via the PEPP. 
 
A crisis is not always negative. It sometimes contains opportunities, too. One of these 
opportunities is the launch of a Euro Safe Asset as a new instrument for investment. It will 
provide a low-risk opportunity to institutional investors worldwide to pump new money 
into Europe’s real economy and recovery. 
 
AVOID PAST MISTAKES – AN OPPORTUNITY TO FUNDAMENTALLY REFORM THE EU 
 
Let us today not repeat the mistakes of the past; the mistakes made during the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis. At the time the Americans, first under President Bush and then 
President Obama, launched a three-stage rocket over nine months to overcome the dramatic 
economic downfall: cleaning up the banks (Troubled Asset Relief Program, $400 billion), 
reinvesting in the economy (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, $831 billion), 
accompanied with quantitative easing through the Federal Reserve Board for a staggering 
amount of $1.2 trillion. We in Europe, by contrast, after more than a decade, are still 
struggling with the economic consequences of the financial crisis. The desperately needed 
Banking Union is still not fully in place. 
 
So, let’s not repeat that scenario. Let’s take the lead in the upcoming battle for the 
recovery of the world's economy. And let’s start the necessary reforms to achieve this now. 
Let’s create new means and new tools at the European level to rescue our continent. 
 
From the Gulf War to 9/11, SARS to the financial crisis and the Eyjafjallajökull ash cloud, 
COVID-19 is not just another crisis in a long list of disasters. COVID-19 is more than that. It 
is an existential crisis that has the potential to break countries and continents alike, and 
maybe even humanity. Will European Union survive it? The answer to that question will 
depend on a fundamental choice: will we do business as usual, or will we use this crisis, and 
the lessons learned, as a unique opportunity to fundamentally reform our Union?  
 
If we choose business as usual, we will come out of this crisis devastated and broken. 
Poorer also, as we will lack the tools to tackle this crisis on a continent-wide scale. If, by 
contrast, we recognise the weaknesses of our governance and the inadequacies of our 
European institutions and above all have the courage to reform them, we shall not only beat 
COVID-19 but we will come out of the crisis stronger and more determined than ever before. 
 
To achieve this, nothing needs to be invented. We simply need to put in place the great ideas 
of our founding fathers, who started the process of European unification in the aftermath of 
that other big European tragedy, the Second World War. New transparent and federal 
institutions are what they thought Europe desperately needed, and crisis after crisis has 
clearly demonstrated that they were right to think so. Unfortunately, the generations that 
followed failed to bring this about, blinded as they were, and we still are by the false 
attractiveness of national sovereignty in a fully globalised world. COVID-19 is a brutal wake-
up call and reminds us that the biggest task in Europe’s history is still ahead of us. 
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